Laundering Maduro’s Legitimacy – Miranda Center for Democracy
A Miranda Center Report

Laundering Maduro's
Legitimacy

How Gustavo Petro helped Nicolás Maduro stay in power after Venezuela's July 28, 2024 presidential election

From the restoration of bilateral ties in 2022 to the U.S. operation that captured Maduro on January 3, 2026, this report examines Colombia's posture toward Venezuela. Its central episode is the July 28, 2024 election and the diplomatic sequence that followed: the presidential silence, the OAS abstention, and the months of mediation that came after.

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The Diplomatic Sequence

The decision points where Bogota had discretion, from the July 28 election to the August communiques.

July 28-29
The CNE halts tally transmission; Amoroso declares Maduro the winner with 51.2% of the vote and withholds the official tally sheets, while the opposition's copies show González winning.
→
July 29-31
Boric and the Brazilian government call for the release of electoral data within minutes; Petro remains silent for approximately 55 hours, speaking only on July 31
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July 31
At the OAS, the resolution calling for the publication of the election results receives 17 of the 18 votes needed for approval; Colombia and Brazil abstain, while Mexico is absent.
→
August
Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico shift from demanding polling station-level data to merely recommending electoral verification.

The language of mediation and dialogue accompanied conduct that lowered the international cost of the fraud, the pattern this report calls whitewashing.

17 / 18
Votes the OAS resolution needed on July 31, 2024 to demand publication of the results. It received 17. A yes from any one of the 11 abstaining states, Colombia among them, would have carried it.

Three Interests Tied Bogota to Caracas

Colombia's posture rested on three interests with Venezuela. Paz Total was the most consequential.

01

Ideology

Shared worldview
  • Ideological affinity with the Chavista project
  • A narrative that blamed the economic collapse on sanctions and the mass exodus on blockades
  • Little room to treat July 28 as the regime's own doing
02

Energy

Venezuelan gas
  • The November 2023 announcement of an Ecopetrol–PDVSA joint venture
  • Venezuelan gas counted as part of the energy transition
  • Leverage handed to Caracas in the relationship
03

Paz Total

Sheltered partners
  • ELN and FARC-dissident factions keep a rear base in Venezuela
  • Confronting Maduro risked Petro's signature peace process
  • The most consequential of the three interests

What the Record Shows

On the Miranda Center's test, the Petro government's conduct after July 28 lowered the international cost of the fraud at the main points where Bogota had discretion: the silence, the OAS abstention, the August communiques, and the September address to the UN. The finding concerns the effect of these decisions and does not depend on proving the existence of a deliberate plan.

The record points to a disposition more than a strategy. A government with four foreign ministers in less than three years was poorly positioned to sustain a coherent diplomatic strategy, yet its choices ran the same way wherever it had discretion. Because the posture depended largely on presidential choices, it may prove reversible.

In March 2026, Colombia's Attorney General's Office identified the Segunda Marquetalia, a dissident armed group sheltered in Venezuela, as the alleged mastermind behind the assassination of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay.

Get the Full Report

Download the documentary record and analysis of Colombia's diplomacy toward Venezuela under Gustavo Petro, from the 2022 restoration of ties to Maduro's capture.

Download Full Report Here
A Miranda Center for Democracy report.