Armies that Own Economies – Miranda Center for Democracy
A Miranda Center Investigation
Armies That Own Economies
Military-Commercial Capture in Cuba and Venezuela
In Cuba and Venezuela, the armed forces are not only instruments of coercion. They are economic actors that own, operate, and profit from substantial parts of the national economy. In Cuba, a single military conglomerate, GAESA, controls an estimated 40–50% of the economy. In Venezuela, 44 defense-linked entities span banking, mining, manufacturing, and retail.
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Two Economies the Military Owns
The measurable scale of military-commercial capture, from a single opaque Cuban holding to a network of 44 Venezuelan entities.
Cuba
40–0%
Of Cuba's economy controlled by GAESA
A single military holding, answerable to no public institution
Cuba
$0B
GAESA assets in 2024
Incl. $14.4B in bank accounts (leaked documents, Miami Herald)
Cuba
<0
People who direct GAESA
One of the largest unaudited financial actors in the hemisphere
Cuba
>0%
Of Cuba's fuel infrastructure
Influenced or controlled by GAESA-linked entities (estimated)
Venezuela
0
Defense-linked entities
24 companies · 20 foundations under the Ministry of Defense
VEN → Cuba
$0B
Transferred to Cuba since 2000
$57.4B of it in inflation-adjusted oil shipments
Two Models, One Logic
Different institutional form, identical political function. Cuba concentrates capture in one holding; Venezuela disperses it across a network, but both convert economic control into the currency of regime survival.
Cuba · Concentrated
One opaque holding
Single centralized conglomerate
Answerable to no public institution
An estimated 40–50% of the economy
Fewer than 15 decision-makers
Venezuela · Dispersed
A network of 44 entities
44 entities under the Ministry of Defense
24 companies · 20 foundations
No financial accountability report published
At least 103 officers on state-company boards
Economic control is a currency in which military loyalty is purchased, and the same apparatus that collects the rents finances and carries out the repression.
From Venezuelan Crude to Cuban Military Wealth
Framed publicly as socialist solidarity, the oil relationship became a financing system. The money circuit is what made GAESA rich.
Subsidized oil
Venezuela → Cuba, preferential terms
→
Freed-up revenue
Cuba redirects energy savings
→
GAESA sectors
tourism · trade · fuel logistics
→
Offshore
Panama · Spain · Luxembourg
Framed publicly as solidarity, it became an "Oil-for-Repression" system: crude as the currency for intelligence services, political control, and regime survival.
$63.8B
Total transferred from Venezuela to Cuba since 2000 through oil subsidies, infrastructure, debt relief, and preferential energy agreements, including $57.4B in inflation-adjusted oil shipments.
Ministry of Defense, or Ministry of Industry?
Venezuela reproduced the GAESA logic in three layers: finance, extraction, and consumer markets, turning the armed forces into a self-managing corporate entity.
01
Finance
Banking & Insurance
BANFANB: 99% military-owned bank
Seguros Horizonte: the country’s second-largest insurer
Financiadora de Primas Horizonte
A closed monetary circuit mirroring GAESA's BFI and Fincimex
02
Extraction
Oil, Gas & Mining
CAMIMPEG rehabilitates PDVSA wells
Mining licenses in the Orinoco Mining Arc (gold, coltan)
Military authority over extractive industries
Operating in territory linked to illegal armed groups
03
Consumer markets
Manufacturing & Logistics
Complejo Industrial Tiuna: textiles, appliances, water
AGROFANB: large-scale agriculture
EMILTRA cargo · EMSOVEN vehicle assembly
Even a digital TV network selling ad space
The 51/49 Mixed Enterprise
The recurring mechanism: the military provides institutional weight, licenses, and state access; a politically connected private partner provides capital and expertise, and gains hard currency at official rates.
51% · Military
49% · Private
$400M
CAMIMPEG + Southern Procurement Services (2017): a PDVSA deal aimed at increasing Campo Urdaneta production by 30,000 bpd.
$427K
CAVIM + Grupo Atahualpa (Complejo Industrial Tiuna I): a joint venture that accessed preferential FX via the state Dicom system.
The Entities Behind the Capture
The military holdings, banks, and private partners that carry the two apparatuses, coded red for Cuba and gold for Venezuela.
GAESA
GAESA
Cuba
Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A., the military holding at the center
CIMEX
CIMEX · Fincimex · BFI
Cuba
Hard-currency, remittance, and offshore banking channels
CAMIM PEG
CAMIMPEG
Venezuela
Military oil, gas & mining; Orinoco extractive licenses
BAN FANB
BANFANB
Venezuela
The armed forces' bank, 99% military-owned
IPSFA
IPSFA
Venezuela
Pension fund repurposed into a real-estate, banking & auto conglomerate
TIUNA
Complejo Ind. Tiuna
Venezuela
Consumer manufacturing hub: textiles to appliances
SPS
Southern Procurement Services
Private partner
51/49 partner in the $400M CAMIMPEG oil deal
ATA
Grupo Atahualpa
Private partner
Tiuna I joint venture; preferential Dicom FX access
Why This Matters Beyond the Two Regimes
These are not inefficiencies to be reformed at the margins. When the armed forces own the balance sheet, economic control becomes the currency that purchases military loyalty: closing markets, entrenching corruption, and diverting national wealth into opaque structures beyond any audit.
Maduro's removal on January 3, 2026 opened a window in Venezuela that may close again unless this architecture is dismantled alongside the government it sustained. In Cuba, even the 2026 "liberalization" of fuel imports reproduced the monopoly; newly authorized importers turned out to be linked to GAESA, ministries, or Castro-family proxies.
As one CubaNet investigation concluded: "GAESA has not relinquished its monopoly."
Get the Full Report
Download the complete comparative investigation into military-commercial capture in Cuba and Venezuela: GAESA, the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense apparatus, and the offshore architecture behind them.